The Battle of Cowpens
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| Date: |
January 17, 1781 |
| Location: |
Cowpens, South Carolina |
| Weather: |
~55-65`F, winds 10knots |
| American Casualties: |
72 |
| British Casualties: |
315 |
| American Leaders: |
Brig.Gen. Daniel Morgan
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| British Leaders: |
Lt.Col. Banastre Tarleton
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The Battle of Cowpens |
Overview:
The battle of Cowpens took place on January 17, 1781. It was a decisive
event in the American Revolution. It was a short battle and did not involve
many people. However, the American victory at Cowpens began the direct chain
of events that lead to independence at Yorktown. The battle was part of the
larger southern campaigns that the British waged throughout 1780 and 1781.
Most of the campaign was characterized by British dominance. The British won
victory after crushing victory throughout 1780. 1780 was perhaps the darkest
year of the Revolution.
Synopsis:
The Battle of the Cowpens was the second serious
disaster which occurred to the British Army, operating in the Southern
States, during the 1780-81 campaign. Following the capitulation of
Charleston on May 12,1780, all of South Carolina was in a condition of
subjugation within a few months, and in September British headquarters were
moved to Charlotte Town, N. C. Prior to this Lieutenant Colonel Ferguson had
been detached, with a small force of Provincials, to organize the militia
and operate on Cornwallis's flank. On the 7th of October his entire command
was lost at Kings Mountain. Following this disaster the British field army
was withdrawn more than 60 miles to Wynnesborough, and there remained on the
defensive while awaiting information relative to the rehabilitation of
Gates's army, now commanded by Greene; and in coordinating plans with the
commander in chief, General Clinton, particularly with reference to the use
of the troops under General Leslie, which were sent from New York to
Virginia.
Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton, the only officer remaining
after Ferguson's death used by Cornwallis for the command of roving troops,
was sent into the district north of Ninety Six to oppose General Morgan, and
somewhat later Cornwallis resumed his march northward. Tarleton and Morgan
met at the Cowpens, on the 17th of January, and in a battle noted for the
unusual tactics adopted by the Americans, the British were defeated, with
heavy losses, by a force inferior in numbers, a considerable portion of
which was militia.
The relation of the Cowpens, to the southern campaign in
1780-81 can be understood only through a knowledge of the purposes of the
two army commanders, Greene and Cornwallis, during the period following
Kings Mountain. After General Clinton's departure from Charleston for New
York on June 5, 1780, he conducted correspondence with Cornwallis relative
to operations contemplated in the Chesapeake. In October General Leslie was
given command of about 2,000 regulars, and sailed from New York to establish
post on the western tributaries of the Chesapeake, near its mouth. The
letter of instructions from Clinton, given him before his departure,
directed him to proceed to those waters and make a diversion in favor of
Cornwallis, who, it was expected, would be, at the time of his arrival, in
central and western North Carolina. The instructions suggested that he
proceed up the James River and destroy enemy magazines at Petersburg,
Richmond, and elsewhere, and finally establish a post on the Elizabeth River
at Portsmouth, but that under any conditions he was to communicate as soon
as possible with Cornwallis and act under his orders.
A copy of the instructions under which Leslie was to act
was received by Cornwallis about the 24th of October, at which time he was
withdrawing from Charlotte Town, and the possibility of carrying out at this
time any plan of joint add on in Virginia was very remote. Lord Rawdon, who
commanded, due to the illness of Cornwallis, immediately dispatched a letter
to Leslie, advising him of the defeat of Ferguson, with its consequent
augmentation of defection in both the Carolinas, and of the necessity of the
British Army remaining within supporting distance of Ninety Six and Camden
until a more favorable moment arrived for the resumption of the offensive.
From the circumstances related in his letter, Lord Rawdon expressed the fear
that the two armies were too far apart to render Leslie's cooperation very
effectual.
Although the British commander in chief had signified to
Cornwallis that he was at liberty to give Leslie any direction for further
cooperation which might appear to him expedient, Cornwallis was loath at
this time to instruct the latter to bring his troops to South Carolina. He
feared that should he withdraw this force from the Chesapeake, he might
interfere with other purposes, unknown to him, to which Clinton had destined
these troops. Rawdon therefore informed Leslie in October that "Lord
Cornwallis thinks himself obliged to leave you at liberty to pursue
whatsoever measures may appear to your judgment best for his majesty's
service and most consonant with the wishes of the commander in chief."
In conclusion Rawdon informed Leslie that should his knowledge of Clinton's
desires prompt him to make a trial upon North Carolina, a movement up Cape
Fear River to Cross Creek was the most likely, at this time, to prove
effectual. The general situation in the South was similarly described by
Rawdon in a letter to Clinton of the 29th of October, wherein was fated the
intention of not definitely ordering Leslie to the Cape Fear, as Clinton
might have other plans with which such a move would interfere.
When Leslie learned of General Cornwallis's desire that
he quit the Chesapeake and move up the Cape Fear to Cross Creek, knowing
that Clinton had no ulterior purpose in keeping him in Virginia, he
immediately planned to make this change and sent dispatches to Clinton on
the 7th of November informing him of the new arrangement. This met with the
entire approval of the commander in chief. A second letter from Lord Rawdon,
written on the 31st of October, wherein he reiterated in a more urgent
manner the wishes of Cornwallis in the matter, was probably the deciding
factor in prompting compliance by Leslie.
Cornwallis established his camp at Wynnesborough in
November. It was evident from the correspondence conducted with Leslie that
he could make no move until he knew where the latter would establish
himself, as his plans for the winter would depend upon this knowledge. The
success of the Americans at Kings Mountain had done much to overcome the
depression in the South, following the defeat at Camden, and partisan forces
were active on both flanks of the British Army. Colonel Marion operated
between the Santee and Peedee, and from this locality threatened
communications and supplies for the post at Camden, and the army at
Wynnesborough. Sumter and his subordinate leaders were active west of the
Broad, threatening Ninety Six. Furthermore, the British had intelligence
that General Morgan, with Washington's cavalry and a body of Continental
infantry, was advancing toward Lynches Creek, with Camden as their
objective.
Early in November Tarleton had been sent east of the
Wateree, and on his arrival at Camden, finding no reason to expect an attack
upon that place by General Morgan, proceeded down the east bank of the river
against Marion. The two forces met on the 10th, but Marion, realizing he was
outnumbered, retreated. During the pursuit an express arrived from General
Cornwallis, sent from Wynnesborough the preceding day, directing Tarleton to
lose no time in returning, as Cornwallis, was "under the greatest
anxiety for Ninety-Six." The circumstance which occasioned this
unexpected order was the predicament into which Major Wemyss, at the head of
40 of Tarleton's dragoons, and the mounted Sixty-third, had gotten. He was
operating along the Broad, and learning that Sumter with about 300 men was
near by, undertook to surprise him by a night attack. The British entered
Sumter's camp by surprise, but instead of dismounting and securing the enemy
arms, they remained mounted. Sumter's men recovered from their surprise, got
their arms, engaged the enemy, wounded Wemyss, and as the second in command
did not know his plans, the British withdrew.
Cornwallis's letter of recall to Tarleton written on the
9th was followed by another on the 10th, and a third on the 11th of
November, so urgent was he that Tarleton appear in the territory of the
Broad to retrieve the situation, and fearful that the other letters might
not have gotten through. In the letter of the 11th he said:
"I wish you would get three legions, and divide yourself into
three parts. We can do no good without you. I trust to your coming
immediately, unless you see something more materially pressing."
Tarleton hastened his return to army headquarters at Wynnesborough, and from
thence continued southwestwardly across the Broad, to locate and engage
Sumter, who was approaching Ninety Six. There followed the fight at
Blackstocks on the 20th of November, wherein General Sumter was wounded.
Following this action Tarleton withdrew to Brierlys Ferry on the Broad. It
was with much gratification that Cornwallis learned of Sumter's wound, for
he wrote, "he certainly has been our greatest plague in this
country."
The recovery of Cornwallis from his illness during
the withdrawal from Charlotte Town, and the successes attendant upon
Tarleton's efforts in the field, stimulated a desire to renew offensive
warfare, and in November he decided to bring Leslie's force to Charleston,
as cooperation with him even at the distance of the Cape Fear River would be
attended with many difficulties. Leslie arrived in Charleston on the 13th of
December, where orders awaited him to march up country with 1,530 men, to
join Cornwallis as soon as possible.
The British plan of campaign for the winter of 1780-81
was for the main army to penetrate into North Carolina, leaving South
Carolina in security against any probable attack. Offensive operations were
to be started about the, middle of January. The line of march was to be by
the upper, or western, roads in preference to lowland routes, because fords
were more frequent above the forks of the rivers, and the passage of the
army could be less easily obstructed. Furthermore, General Greene being on
the Peedee, and there being few fords in any of the great rivers of this
country below their forks, especially in the rainy season, a penetration
north, by way of Salisbury, would probably meet with much resistance by
Greene's army.
Cornwallis was the more induced to prefer the western
route, as he hoped to destroy or drive out of South Carolina the corps
commanded by General Morgan, which, it will be noted later, was sent into
the region of the Broad and Pacolet, during the latter part of December, to
threaten the valuable district of Ninety Six. There was hope, also, that by
rapid marches the British main army would get between Greene and Virginia,
and by that means force the Americans to fight without receiving any
reinforcements from that State, or, failing in this, to oblige Greene to
quit North Carolina with precipitation, and thereby encourage the friends of
the Crown to make good their promises of a general rising to assist the
British commander in reestablishing the Royal Government.
While Tarleton lay on the Broad, following the fight at
Blackstocks, it became known to the British that General Morgan and Colonel
Washington had been detached from Charlotte Town on December 20th and had
proceeded across the Broad in the direction of Ninety Six, which post was
viewed by Cornwallis as the most sensitive of all under his command. On the
30th of December Cornwallis advised Tarleton of this threat, and on the 1st
of the following month sent his aide with orders that Tarleton should cross
the Broad with his corps of Cavalry and Infantry of 550 men, the First
Battalion of the Seventy-first, consisting of 200 men, and one 3-pounder, to
counteract the designs of General Morgan, by protecting the country and
compelling him to repass the Broad. The danger of Morgan's presence west of
the Broad was felt so acutely by Cornwallis that the day after he dispatched
his aide with this message to Tarleton, he wrote an additional admonition:
"If Morgan is still at Williams's, or anywhere within your
reach, I should wish you to push him to the utmost; I have not heard,
except from McArthur, of his having cannon; nor would I believe it,
unless he has it from very good authority; it is, however, possible, and
Ninety Six is of so much consequence, that no time is to be lost.
Let me know, if you think that the moving the whole, or any part
of my corps can be of use."
On the receipt of this letter Tarleton immediately directed his course to
the westward, leaving his baggage behind, but he had not proceeded more than
20 miles from Brierleys Ferry before he was satisfied that Morgan was
nowhere near Fort Williams and that for the time being Ninety Six was not
threatened. He therefore decided to camp, bring up his baggage, and make
certain recommendations to Cornwallis relative to the ensuing campaign, as
was called for in the latter's letter of the 2d. Tarleton wrote on the 4th
asking that his baggage be forwarded under escort of the Seventeenth Light
Dragoons, the Yagers, and the Seventh Regiment. "When I advance, I must
either destroy Morgan's corps," he said, or push it before me over
Broad River, toward Kings Mountain. The advance of the army should commence
(when your lordship orders this corps to move) onward for Kings Mountain.
Frequent communication by letter can pass the Broad River." It is to be
noted that at this time Tarleton and Cornwallis occupied interior positions,
separated less than 24 hours in messenger service, while Morgan and Greene
lay beyond them in opposite directions, and from 5 to 10 days apart by
messenger. On the 5th of January Cornwallis approved the suggestions
relative to combined action as mentioned in Tarleton's letter of the day
before, and informed him that the Seventh Regiment was escorting his baggage
to Brierleys Ferry, and that he, Cornwallis, proposed marching on January 7.
Two hundred men of the Seventh Regiment, who were mostly recruits and
designed for the garrison at Ninety Six, 50 dragoons of the Seventeenth
Regiment, and a 3-pounder, brought the wagons from Brierleys Ferry to camp.
Upon the arrival of the baggage and reinforcing troops, Tarleton crossed
Indian and Duncan Creeks, and on his advance received accounts of the
increase of Morgan's corps, which induced him to halt his march and request
permission of Cornwallis to retain the Seventh Regiment. This request having
been granted, on the 12th he continued his course to the westward in order
to discover the most practicable fords, and the Enoree and Tiger were passed
on the 14th, above the Cherokee Road. That evening Tarleton obtained
information that Morgan was on the Pacolet, guarding all the fords. In the
meanwhile Cornwallis's march northward had not been made in accordance with
his plans, as the junction of Leslie's command had been much retarded by
high waters, and it was not until the 14th that "Leslie is at last out
of the swamps," at which time Cornwallis was at Bull Run.
On the 15th Tarleton made a reconnaissance of Morgan's
dispositions covering the fords of the Pacolet, and that evening a feint was
made to cross high up the river. The morning of the 16th this course was
altered, as it was now known that Morgan had with, drawn from the Pacolet,
and a passage was secured within 6 miles of the hostile camp. The British
continued their march for several miles, and hatted in some log huts to rest
and reconnoiter Morgan's whereabouts. Tarleton intended to post his troops
behind the huts in case Morgan showed an inclination to attack him in this
position. In his narrative he says that the camp afforded a plentiful supply
of half-cooked provisions, left by the Americans that day. Patrols and spies
were dispatched to observe the Americans during the night, and dragoons
followed until dark, when they were ordered back to the main body. Early in
the night the patrols reported that Morgan had withdrawn to Thicketty Creek,
and that several groups of partisans were en route to join him. Tarleton
determined to push ahead promptly for the purpose of engaging Morgan before
he could effect a passage of the Broad, and before his numbers were too
greatly augmented. Accordingly at 3 o'clock on the morning of the 17th the
pursuit was resumed. The wagons and baggage of his train were left in camp
under the protection of a small detachment from each corps.
The disaster which befell the American Army at Camden on
the 16th of August resulted in Congress passing a resolution on the 5th of
October ordering General Washington to direct a court of inquiry to be held
on the conduct of Major General Gates, as commander of the southern army,
and to appoint his successor. Washington designated Maj. Gen. Nathanael
Greene, second in command in the main army, and an officer whose ability,
loyalty, and capacity for command were fully appreciated by the commander in
chief. On the receipt of instructions from General Washington and Congress,
Greene proceeded south, stopping in Philadelphia to confer with Congress,
and in the several States on his way, which were immediately concerned in
furnishing men and supplies for the Southern Department. He desired to
acquire a knowledge of the military situation therein, and plan for the
regular support and subsistence of his command in provisions, forage, and
transportation. Before leaving Philadelphia he wrote to Washington that his
first object would be to equip a flying army of 800 horses and 1,000
Infantry. Greene held the services of Cavalry and mounted Infantry in high
regard, the contrary view being entertained by the officer whom he was to
relieve. Lieut. Col. Henry Lee was one of the officers whom he desired to
conduct partisan warfare, which he knew would constitute an important factor
in his campaigns. General Greene reached Charlotte Town, where Gates's
headquarters were now established, on the 2d of December, and on the
following day the latter issued his final order to the troops, turning the
command over to General Greene. While traversing Maryland, Virginia, and
North Carolina, wise and energetic measures had been taken by Greene, in
consultation with the State authorities, to insure that cooperation and
assistance would be forthcoming. A survey of his troops at once confirmed
his previous knowledge of their needs for food, clothing, transportation,
and shelter, as learned from Gates's reports on these matters, and his
attention to the correction of these deficiencies was incessant and
laborious. His ability as a quartermaster was in no wise inferior to his
worth as a commander in the field, and the detailed manner in which he
directed the betterment of conditions is a high tribute to his general
efficiency. The logistics of supply were carefully covered in his many
instructions for the surveys of all possible water routes, the construction
of bateaux, the listing of animals and wagons for transportation, and for
the operation of mills, ironworks, and other utilities.
Pending improvement in his numbers, and augmentation in
the necessary supplies, the army was to remain inactive. The country around
Charlotte Town had been depleted so thoroughly of food and forage, that on
the 8th of December Greene wrote to Colonel Kosciusko to examine the country
along the Peedee for a distance of 20 or 30 miles south of Little River, for
a good position for the army.
During this enforced period of combat inaction and
rehabilitation, intelligence of the enemy was most essential, particularly
in view of the many rumors that Cornwallis was to be reinforced by way of
the Cape Fear, or through Charleston. For this work troops that were well
mounted and extremely mobile were necessary, due to the great distance
covered, and Marion, who operated in the eastern part of South Carolina, was
selected for this duty. On the 4th of December a letter of instructions was
sent to this officer by Greene directing him to continue partisan warfare,
thereby harassing the enemy and preserving the tide of sentiment among the
people as much as possible in favor of the patriotic cause. Upon Marion he
would depend for early information of reinforcements
arriving in Charleston, or departing there from to join
Cornwallis. To secure this information, and other that might be necessary,
Marion was to employ spies and organize an intelligence service.
The unhappy condition of the southern army is pictured in
a letter written to Washington on the 7th of December, wherein Greene says:
"Nothing can be more wretched and distressing than the condition
of the troops, starving, with cold and hunger, without tents and camp
equipage. Those of the Virginia line are literally naked, and a great
part totally unfit for any kind of duty, and must remain so until
clothing can be had from the northward."
The magnitude of the work confronting Greene in his responsibility for the
retention of the Southern States in the Confederation, and the earnestness
with which he engaged in his labors, will be understood by reading the seven
lengthy letters written by him on the 6th and 7th of December to Baron von
Steuben, who was in Virginia under his command, General Washington, General
Knox, the President of Congress, the Board of War, Governor Nash, and
Governor Jefferson.
After two weeks of arduous attention to a multitude of
details, report having been received in the meanwhile from Kosciusko of a
favorable site for the army on the Peedee, the troops were put under
marching orders on the 16th, but due to heavy rains the march was postponed
until the 20th. The route followed was by way of Wadesborough to Haleys
Ferry, thence to the position selected on the east bank of the Peedee,
opposite to Cheraw Hill, which was reached on the 26th. General Greene
called his new location a "camp of repose," adding in this
connection, in a letter to Washington written on the 28th of December, "no
army ever wanted one more, the troops having totally lost their
discipline."
General Greene was fortunate in his selection of
officers to surround him, and part of his success in the South must be
attributed to these capable leaders and administrators. There were Von
Steuben, Lee and his legion, which joined on the Peedee early in January,
Williams, Morgan, William Washington, Howard, Carrington, Davie, and the
partisan leaders, Sumter, Marion, Pickens, and others, all highly reputed as
leaders in their several lines of activities, imbued with a spirit of
loyalty for their commander, and possessed of an unquenchable determination
to attain the independence of their country.
Before departing from Charlotte Town, General Greene
arranged to send General Morgan with an independent command to operate along
the tributaries of the Broad and Pacolet, threatening the British post at
Ninety Six and the left of Cornwallis's army. During the great depression
which existed in the South after the defeat of Gates at Camden, and while
the British were triumphantly advancing to Charlotte Town, Morgan had
returned to active duty in the Army and joined Gates at Hillsborough in
September. Congress appointed him a brigadier general on the 13th of
October.
The duty to be performed by Morgan's command was so far
removed from Greene's headquarters, with the British Army between, that
detailed instructions, were prepared for his guidance:
Camp Charlotte, December 16,1780.
"You are appointed to the command of a corps of light infantry
of 320 men detached from the Maryland line, a detachment of Virginia
militia of 200 men, and Colonel Washington's regiment of light horse,
amounting to from sixty to a hundred men. With these troops you will
proceed to the west side of the Catawba River, where you will be joined
by a body of volunteer militia under command of General Davidson of this
State, and by the militia lately under command of General Sumter. This
force and such others as may join you from Georgia, you will employ
against the enemy on the west side of the Catawba, either offensively or
defensively, as your own prudence and discretion may direct—acting
with caution and avoiding surprises by every possible precaution. For
the present, I give you the entire command in that quarter, and do
hereby require all officers and soldiers engaged in the American cause
to be subject to your orders and commands.
The object of this detachment is to give protection to that part
of the country and spirit up the people—to annoy the enemy in that
quarter-to collect the provision and forage out of their way—which you
will have formed into a number of small magazines in the rear of the
position you may think proper to take. You will prevent plundering as
much as possible and be as careful of your provisions and forage as may
be, giving receipts for whatever you take to all such as are friends to
the independence of America.
Should the enemy move in force toward the Pee Dee, where the army
will take a position, you will move in such a direction as to enable you
to join me if necessary, or fall upon the flank, or into the rear of the
enemy, as occasion may require. You will spare no pains to get good
intelligence of the enemy's situation and keep me constantly advised of
both your and their movements. You win appoint, for the time being, a
commissary, quartermaster, and forage master, who will follow your
instructions in their respective lines. Confiding in your abilities and
activity, I entrust you with this command, being persuaded you will do
everything in your power to distress the enemy and afford protection to
the country."
Given under my hand at Charlotte this 16th December, 1780.
To Brig. Gen. MORGAN. NATH. GREENE.
Morgan's command of approximately 600 men left Charlotte
Town on the 21st of December, reaching the Catawba that evening, and the
following morning crossed the river at Biggers Ferry. From thence the march
led to Cane Creek, and the following day, the 24th, the Broad was crossed,
and on the 25th camp was made on the north bank of the Pacolet, at Grindalls
Ford. Here Morgan was joined, a few days later, by a party of mounted
militia under Colonel Pickens and Major McCall.
Early in December General Greene had given orders to
General Davidson, of North Carolina, to join Morgan with militia gathered
from that State, when the latter had crossed the river; but the British
authorities incited the Cherokee Indians to ravage the western settlements,
and the men of Burke, Rutherford, Washington, and Sullivan Counties were
engaged in safeguarding their homes. Davidson did arrive in Morgan's camp on
the Pacolet toward the end of December with 120 men, but returned at once to
North Carolina for the drafts that had been ordered to assemble in the
district of Salisbury.
On the 27th of December Morgan received intelligence that
a body of Georgia Tories, about 250 in number, had advanced as far as Fair
Forest, and were committing depredations in that region. For the purpose of
routing them he sent Washington's dragoons, and 200 mounted militia under
Major McCall, on the 29th. The hostile force was about 20 miles from
Grindalls Ford, in the direction of Ninety Six. The enemy withdrew on the
approach of Washington's command, but after a hard march of 40 miles they
were encountered the next day at Hammonds Storehouse, and dispersed with
great loss. Although at considerable distance from supporting troops, and
within range of Ninety Six and Wynnesborough, Washington proceeded to march
against a British post called Fort Williams, on the road from Wynnesborough
to Ninety Six, and about 15 miles northeast of the latter place. General
Cunningham, who was in charge of the Tory militia in this region, evacuated
the fort, and Washington perceived the wisdom of retracing his steps to the
Pacolet. In the meanwhile Morgan detached 200 men to cover the withdrawal of
Washington's command, to guard against any misfortune that might occur to
it. At the time of reporting the success at Hammonds Storehouse,
Morgan wrote to Greene on the 31st that the militia were coming in fast, and
suggested that when he had collected his force he desired to march into
Georgia, if the main army could, at the time, make a diversion against
Cornwallis. To expedite this movement, should it meet with the approval of
General Greene, he had sent for 100 swords, which he intended putting into
the hands of expert riflemen, to be mounted and incorporated with
Washington's corps. He said, "It is incompatible with the nature of
light troops to be encumbered with baggage," and called for 100
packsaddles to replace wagon transportation, where necessary or desirable.
Morgan remained on the Pacolet to await a reply to his
letter of the 31st of December covering the foregoing suggestion, but
developments were now so rapid that it became impossible to give further
serious thought to a march on Georgia. Greene knew that Leslie was advancing
on Camden, at which place a strong post had been established under Lord
Rawdon, and in replying on the 8th of January to Morgan's letter which
reached him the 7th, he did not think an expedition into Georgia was
"warrantable in the critical situation our Army is in."
"'Should you go into Georgia, and the enemy push this way, your whole
force will be useless."
Greene intimated to Morgan that by remaining where he was
he was favorably situated to interrupt communications with Ninety Six and
Augusta, and to harass the enemy rear should Cornwallis attempt to push
forward. He was cautioned to attempt no major enterprise, unless by
surprise, "for you will only beat your heads against the wall
without success." As a further warning, Greene added: "I
must repeat my caution to you to guard against a surprise."
Before receiving from General Greene a reply to his
letter of December 31, Morgan wrote the former again on January 4, as to the
difficulties of obtaining forage and provisions in the vicinity of his camp,
and declared the necessity either to move into Georgia or retreat. He had
spies watching the enemy and did not consider himself in danger of being
surprised. Greene replied to this communication on the 13th with the advice
that Morgan hold his present ground, as a retreat would discourage the
militia, and informed him that "Colonel Tarleton is said to be on his
way to pay you a visit." This letter did not reach its destination
before the action at the Cowpens.
On the 14th of January Morgan learned that Tarleton had
crossed the Tiger at Musgroves Mill, and he prepared to change his position
in the direction of the Broad. Leaving detachments to observe the fords over
the Pacolet, the army was put in motion on the 15th, and that evening camped
at Burrs Mills on Thicketty Creek. It was on this same day that Tarleton
reached the Pacolet and reconnoitered the crossings. His strength was
estimated by Morgan to be from 1,100 to 1,200 men.
Continuing his retirement on the 16th, the Cowpens were
reached, where small parties joined during the night, and the spirit of the
camp was strong for fight. Morgan doubtless viewed this augmentation of
strength and the high spirits of the men as a favorable omen, and determined
to offer battle the following day. The proposed plan of deployment was
explained to the several leaders, particular attention being given to the
part the militia, whom Pickens was to command, would take in the battle. For
the purpose of strengthening Washington's Cavalry, 45 militia were selected
for their ability as horsemen and rifle shots, armed with sabers, provided
with suitable mounts and attached to the dragoons.
The place where General Morgan established his camp the
night of the 16th was near the intersection of the Mill Gap Road and the
road from the present city of Spartanburg running northeast into North
Carolina, and crossing the Broad River at Island Ford, Many roads of more
recent construction now traverse this territory, but during the
Revolutionary period they were few in number. The Mill Gap Road crossed the
Broad at Cherokee Ford and ran northwestwardly through the present town of
Gaffney, into the mountains far to the west. Its course followed generally
the tops of ridges, thereby avoiding the crossing of creeks and rivers. The
road from Spartanburg to North Carolina now runs through Chesnee, but in
olden days it crossed the Mill Gap Road about 3 miles southeast of Chesnee.
Morgan made camp in a wooded ravine having a stream of water running through
it, which lay north of the Mill Gap Road, and about a thousand yards
northwest of the cabin of Robert Scruggs, which was visited by Lossing in
1849.
The position selected for the action lay on both sides of
the Mill Gap Road, just south of the camp. The ground is slightly
undulating, and at the time was covered with scattered trees of red oak,
hickory, and pine. Being used for the grazing of cattle, there was but
little, if any, underbrush. Two very slight elevations top the ridge along
which the Mill Gap Road runs, and these were selected as the lines of
deployment for the American troops.
The main position was on the elevation just south of the
ravine, in which camp was established. To its front for 300 yards there is a
scarcely perceptible slope downward; beyond this the slope is greater,
dropping off into a shallow ravine 700 yards from the main position. To the
rear of the main position, and just west of the camp site, is an elevation
slightly higher than that of the main position. This ridge continues across
the road in a south and southwest direction, but at a slightly less
elevation. From either ridge the terrain between the two was visible under
and through the trees. The ground offered no cover for either the attack or
the defense, except such as was furnished by the trees. The flanks of both
armies were exposed, as the terrain was favorable in all directions for the
operation of mounted troops. The ravine in which Morgan camped and one on
the opposite side of the road offered but little interference with the
movement of foot or mounted troops.
Morgan's plan of battle was to use the Maryland
Continentals and the Virginia Militia (of worth equal to the Continentals,
as many had served in previous campaigns) in his main position on the summit
of the southernmost ridge and astride the Mill Gap Road. Washington's
dragoons to the number of 80, augmented by the 45 militia under McCall, were
the main reserve, posted in rear of the northernmost ridge, where ground
cover was sufficient to protect them from hostile observation and fire and
sufficiently near "as to be able to charge the enemy, should they be
broken." The militia were to form an interrupted line on the flanks in
front, which position was to be held only temporarily, when they were to
withdraw and reform on the flanks of the main position after reorganization
had been effected and lend what assistance they could as an additional
reserve.
At this time Howard's Maryland and Delaware Continentals
consisted of 237 men. They were placed on the left of the line, astride the
Mill Gap Road. To their right were Captain Beatie's and Major Triplett's
companies of Virginia Militia, under the command of the latter, and totaling
about 100 men. Captains Tate and Buchanan, with about 100 of the Augusta
riflemen of Virginia, supported the right of the line. In the advanced
position, which was to be abandoned early in the fight, were about 308
militia from North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, under Colonel
Pickens. These troops were situated to guard the flanks. Major McDowell, of
the North Carolina Volunteers, was posted on the right flank, 150 yards in
front of Howard's line. Major Cunningham, of the Georgia Volunteers, was on
the left flank, at the same distance in front of Howard's line. To the right
of Major McDowell were posted the South Carolina Volunteers under Colonels
Brannon and Thomas. To the left of Major Cunningham was posted the remainder
of the South Carolina Militia, under Colonel Hays and Major Hammond. The
latter commanded Major McCall's regiment, he being with Colonel Washington.
From Pickens's line of militia small parties of riflemen
were sent 150 yards farther to the front to skirmish with the enemy.
McDowell commanded those in the right sector of the skirmish line and
Cunningham those in the left sector. Patrols covered the front and flanks to
give warning of Tarleton's approach.
Tarleton broke camp at 3 o'clock in the morning,
determined to engage the Americans before they could cross the Broad, or in
case they made an early march and continued their withdrawal, to strike them
when astride the river. The baggage and wagons were to remain in camp, under
protection of a detachment from each corps, until daybreak. The advance
guard consisted of three companies of light infantry, supported by the
legion infantry. The main body comprised the Seventh Regiment, the two
3-pounders, and the First Battalion of the Seventy-first Infantry. The
cavalry and mounted infantry brought up the rear. The march was slow, due to
the ground being broken by creeks and ravines, and the necessity for careful
reconnaissance on the front and flanks. Before dawn a screen of cavalry was
placed on the front, soon after which contact was made with the American
patrols, when Tarleton ordered two troops of dragoons to reinforce the
advance guard and harass the rear of the enemy.
In due course of time the advance guard reported that the
Americans were forming, and the native guides with Tarleton described their
position as in an open woods, free from swamps, with the Broad parallel to
their rear. Tarleton viewed the enemy's situation as one vulnerable to
attack, particularly in view of his superiority in cavalry, and the
inability of a defeated force to escape beyond the Broad. Further, more, the
supposed nearness of Cornwallis and the assumed superiority of his regulars
over the large percentage of militia with Morgan made it seem apparent that
success should be attended with no great loss to his command. His total
strength, including the detachment left to guard the baggage, was about
1,000.
The dragoons in the advance guard drove in the hostile
covering forces along the Mill Gap Road, thereby enabling Tarleton to
proceed far enough to inspect the deployment of Morgan's army. It is
probable that his estimate of the strength of the opposing forces was
considerably less than the total of 1,920 mentioned later in his narrative.
Even though he believed that he was opposed by about 500 Continentals, 120
cavalry, 1,000 militia, and 300 backwoodsmen, he probably ignored the two
latter groups, and considered himself superior in quality to the American
Continentals and cavalry, who made a force much smaller than his regulars.
Prior to deploying the infantry were directed to discard
all surplus equipment and retain only their rifles and ammunition. The light
infantry then filed to the right, into a position opposite to Morgan's
militia, with their right flank extending as far as the left of the militia.
The legion infantry were added to the left of the light infantry, and a
3-pounder placed in the line between the two commands. This force was
instructed to advance within 300 yards of the enemy. When this position was
reached, the Seventh Regiment formed upon the left of the legion infantry,
and the other 3-pounder was given to the right division of the Seventh. A
captain, with 50 dragoons, was placed on each flank of the line, to protect
its flanks and threaten those of the enemy. The First Battalion of the
Seventy-first Regiment formed 150 yards in rear of the left flank of the
Seventh, and constituted, together with about 200 legion cavalry, the
reserve.
The British deployment being completed at about 8
o'clock, Tarleton ordered his troops to attack. The whole line moved with
the greatest impetuosity, shouting as they advanced. The Americans responded
with Indian war cries of equal intensity, and held their fire until the
enemy closed to effective rifle range, when the front-line skirmishers under
Cunningham and McDowell gave them a "heavy and galling fire, and
retreated to the regiments intended for their support." Tarleton's
infantry suffered but little from this fire and continued their approach to
Pickens's line, which "kept up a fire by regiments, retreating
agreeably to their orders." Still the British line suffered but little,
and now it approached the Continentals and the Virginians under Howard.
Here, according to Morgan, they received a "'well-directed and
incessant fire." Tarleton says "'the fire on both sides was well
supported, and produced much slaughter." The British advance was
temporarily checked.
At this time Tarleton sent the troop of dragoons on the
right of the line to harass that portion of the militia which had fallen
back to the left of Pickens's line, and at the same time ordered forward his
reserve. The First Battalion of the Seventy-first was directed to pass the
left of the Seventh before delivering its fire. The reserve cavalry and the
troop on the left of the line were ordered to incline to the left and form a
line which would embrace the whole of the American right flank. When the
battalion of the Seventy-first was in position, the entire British line
moved forward. Tarleton now had about 750 infantry in line, supported by two
guns, and was opposed by less than 450 infantry in Howard's line. Whether or
not the militia, which had withdrawn to the two flanks of Howard's line,
could be later assembled and used in the fight could not at this time be
determined. Those who had withdrawn to the left rear of the main position
were charged by the troop of dragoons from the right of Tarleton's line and
were being cut down, when Washing, ton countercharged with his cavalry,
supported by some infantry fire, and relieved the situation in that quarter.
It was evident to Howard that with the enemy reserve
brought into action his right flank was exposed, and he ordered the flank
company to change front to the right. In doing this some confusion ensued,
and first a part and then the whole of the company commenced a retreat. The
officers along Howard's line seeing this, and supposing that orders had been
given for a retreat, faced their men about and moved of. Morgan, at this
time, was engaged in reforming the militia, and was surprised to observe the
Maryland and Delaware Continentals, who had fought so valiantly at Camden,
in apparent retreat. He quickly rode over to Howard to inquire into the
situation and his apprehensions were quieted when Howard, pointing to the
line, observed that "men were not beaten who retreated in that
order." Morgan then ordered Howard to continue retiring his line until
the rising ground to the rear was reached, and rode back to select the
position on which the line was to halt and face about.
The halt and change of front was effected without mishap,
and although this retreat resulted from misunderstanding, it was very
fortunate, as Howard's units were thereby extricated from a position wherein
they doubtless would have been defeated with heavy losses.
So certain were the British that victory was at hand that
they pushed forward to close in on the retreating force with the bayonet,
and an order was dispatched to the cavalry on the right to charge. Not more
than 30 yards separated them from the Americans, when the latter
unexpectedly halted and changed front, and again confronted them with a
deadly volley, which stopped the British in their tracks and threw them into
great confusion. Lieutenant Colonel Howard observing this, gave orders
for the line to charge bayonets, which was done with such address, that they
fled with the utmost precipitation, leaving their field pieces in our
possession.
Some of the militia which had withdrawn to Howard's right
were reformed and participated in the rout.
Further exertions to make the British infantry advance
were useless. Nor could Tarleton's cavalry strike, for it was at the moment
when they were prepared to charge the retreating line that Howard halted and
faced his command about, and the panic which seized the British infantry
extended to the cavalry also, and a general flight ensued. Tarleton sent
directions to his cavalry to form about 400 yards to the right of the enemy,
whilst he endeavored to rally the infantry to protect the guns.
The cavalry did not comply with the order, and the effort
to collect the infantry was ineffectual; neither promises nor threats could
gain their attention; they surrendered or dispersed, and abandoned the guns
to the artillerymen, who defended them for some time with exemplary
resolution.
In this last stage of defeat, Tarleton in his narrative
says that he made a final struggle to bring his cavalry to the charge, but
all attempts to restore order proved fruitless.
Above 200 dragoons forsook their leader and left the
field of battle.
He was able to rally a group of 14 officers and about 40
horsemen, and with these engaged the cavalry of Washington, who in the
latter stage of the fight were adding to the general confusion of the enemy
by passing around Howard's right and charging into the broken ranks of the
enemy. The contest between the two mounted groups was short lived, and
Tarleton fled from the field, the action having lasted about 50 minutes. He
directed his course to the southeast in order to reach Hamilton Ford, near
the mouth of Bullock Creek, where he might communicate with Cornwallis, who
had not advanced beyond Turkey Creek. A part of Washington's command pursued
scattered groups of the enemy cavalry for some distance, returning to camp
late that night.
The British losses, as reported by General Morgan in a
letter dated the 19th of January, were 10 officers and 100 noncommissioned
officers and privates killed; 200 rank and file wounded; 502 noncommissioned
officers and privates prisoners, independent of the wounded, and 29
commissioned officers prisoners. This totals approximately 841, and is
somewhat in excess of the entire British infantry and artillery personnel in
the battle. The losses in the legion cavalry were not heavy, and that night
and the next day 200 of their scattered numbers rejoined Tarleton. The
spoils of war included 2 standards, 2 field pieces, 800 stand of arms, 100
dragoon horses, and 35 wagons. The baggage which had been left in camp was
in a great measure destroyed by its guard before they fled.
Cornwallis's return of troops shows the following
changes in the organizations under Tarleton's command:
| Unit |
Jan. 15 |
Feb. 1 |
| Seventh Regiment |
167
|
---
|
| Seventy-first Regiment: |
|
|
| First Battalion |
249
|
|
| Light company |
69
|
|
| British Legion |
451
|
174
|
| Total |
936
|
174
|
In addition to the foregoing, Tarleton had about 40 men of the
Seventeenth Dragoons and a detachment of artillery to man the two
3-pounders. The American losses were inconsiderable, there not having been
more than 12 killed and about 60 wounded.
Tarleton attributed his defeat to—
"the bravery or good conduct of the Americans; to the loose
manner of forming which had always been practiced by the King's troops
in America; or to some unforeseen event, which may throw terror into the
most disciplined soldiers or counteract the best-concerted
designs."
He held the opinion that commanding officers in the Army, who were
unfortunate in action, should be subject to the same rules which governed
the Navy, to the effect that a court-martial would inquire into the merits
of the case. Influenced by this thought, some days after the action Tarleton
"required Earl Cornwallis's approbation of his proceedings, or his
leave to retire till inquiry could be instituted to investigate his
conduct." To this demand Cornwallis replied in a letter of the 30th of
January:
"You have forfeited no part of my esteem as an officer by the
unfortunate event of the action of the 17th. The means you used to bring
the enemy to action were able and masterly, and must ever do you honor.
Your disposition was unexceptionable; the total misbehavior of the
troops could alone have deprived you of the glory which was so justly
your due."
Conclusions:
The battle of Cowpens also began the direct military line which
lead to Yorktown. Although the battle shattered Cornwallis' army and
deprived it of much of its light troops, Cornwallis continued to pursue the
Americans northward. Shortly afterwards, he fought the battle of Guilford
Court House in North Carolina. Not long after that, Cornwallis was trapped
and beaten near a Virginia port-Yorktown. The war may well have ended in an
American triumph without Morgan's stunning victory. It almost certainly
would not have been as quick and decisive, though, had it not been for the
battle of Cowpens.
Recommended readings: (Click on link to purchase)
 |
Title: A
Devil of a Whipping : The Battle of Cowpens || Author: Lawrence
E. Babits || ISDN: 0-80782-434-8 || Released: November
1998 |
| It's easy to forget that the British won
most of the battles during the American Revolution. The Americans
certainly carried the day at Saratoga and Yorktown, but they were
beaten again and again by their enemy elsewhere--and often badly. So
it's especially odd that the Battle of Cowpens, fought in South
Carolina on January 17, 1781, isn't better remembered in American
imagination. As author Lawrence E. Babits shows, Cowpens was the
Continental troops' greatest tactical moment--and it marked a crucial
turning point in the war. The fight itself was fairly brief, and the
outcome lopsided--it was "a devil of a whipping," as
American leader Daniel Morgan said at the time. Babits provides a
richly detailed account of the battle, including an especially good
overview of the weapons and tactics used by troops of the time. An
archaeologist by training, Babits approaches Cowpens with the familiar
meticulousness of his profession; this is an important piece of
scholarship on the military history of the American Revolution. |
 |
Title: The
Road to Guilford Courthouse: The American Revolution in the Carolinas
|| Author: John Buchanan || ISDN: 0-47132-716-6 || Released:
July 1999 |
| Most of us are
familiar with the role that North and South Carolina played in the
American Civil War: if nothing else, every grade-schooler knows the
significance of the 1861 bombardment of Fort Sumter in Charleston
Harbor. But to popular historian John Buchanan, "that tragedy
is of far less interest than the American Revolution. The Revolution
was the most important event in American history. The Civil War was
unfinished business." And the Carolinas, Buchanan convincingly
argues, were the most critical theater in that conflict, with their
wild Back Country seeing "a little-known but savage civil war far
exceeding anything in the North." |
