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The Battle of Fort Washington
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The Battle of Fort Washington |
Overview:
Heavy rains spoiled Maj. Gen, William Howe's planned
second attack on the American army near White Plains on October 31. The
next day the Americans were found to be apparently well entrenched at North
Castle Heights. The rebel earthworks were composed largely of cornstalks
pulled from nearby fields, whose roots, full of clinging soil, faced
outward. Howe may have been discouraged by these illusory defenses, but
his goal remained the complete removal of American troops from Manhattan, not
the annihilation of Washington's army. His attention returned to Fort
Washington which the American commander in chief had left garrisoned under Col.
Robert Magaw after a general rebel evacuation of the island.
Synopsis:
On the night of November 2 a defector, William
Demont, entered the camp of Lord Hugh Percy at McGowan's Pass, south of Fort
Washington. Demont had been Magaw's adjunct; the deserter placed the
plans of the fort into Percy's hands. Although Howe had probably already
begun to arrange operations against Fort Washington, exact knowledge of the
fortification and its defenses would assist his attack.
Fort Washington's works, built the previous July, covered a
hill 230 feet high (modern West 184th Street) and a mile long. Vertical
cliffs rendered the fort unassailable from the Hudson River below.
Additional protection was provided by Fort Tyron on the north, Laurel Hiss on
the east, and the old Harlem Heights defenses on the south. Fort Lee
stood opposite Fort Washington in New Jersey. Between the two forts ran a
line of sunken obstructions to prevent British ships from passing up the
Hudson.
The natural defenses afforded by Fort Washington's
position were superior, but the fort itself was less than ideal. A
pentagonal earthwork without ditches or palisades, the structure lacked
barracks, bombproofs, and an interior source of water. A captain
stationed in the fort noted that it had none of "those exterior, multiplied
obstacles and defenses, that...could entitle it to the name of fortress, in any
degree capable of withstanding a siege." This weakness, recognized by
some of the garrison went unnoticed by Maj. Gen. Nathaniel Greene, who was in
charge of both forts.
Washington had been out of touch with Greene since October
22. Now, as Howe began moving south to direct the seizure of Fort
Washington, the American commander had to consider the fort's
defensibility. On November 5 three British vessels passed over the river
barricades in the Hudson amidst rebel artillery fire and anchored, undamaged,
at the northern tip of the island, Washington, in the process of
deploying most of his troops in Westchester County, was much alarmed by this
news and wrote to Greene on November 8, "I am inclined to think it will not be
prudent to hazard the men and stores," but "as you are on the spot, I leave it
to you to give such orders as to evacuating Mount Washington as you judge
best."
Greene replied that the fort served some purpose beyond the
prevention of ship passage up the Hudson. It hampered British
communication between the island and the country to the north, compelled the
maintenance of British troops at Kingsbridge (which connected Manhattan to
Westchester County), and was clearly regarded as important by the British, or
else they would not attempt its capture. These arguments were offset by
Greene's assurance that if the situation grew dangerous, the stores and men
could be shifted to Fort Lee at any time. Magaw said the garrison could
hold out through December. But Washington's second in command, Maj. Gen.
Charles Lee, expressed ominous concern. In a letter to Joseph Reed, the
adjutant general, Lee wrote, "I cannot conceive what circumstances give to Fort
Washington so great a degree of value and importance as to counterbalance the
probability or almost certainty of losing 1,400 of our best troops."
With some 2,000 of his troops, Washington moved down the
west side of the Hudson and reached Fort Lee on November 13. Meanwhile,
Greene had reinforced Magaw's original garrison of about 2,000 men (Lee's
figure was low) with an additional 900. Greene continued to favor a
defense of the fort, and Washington finally relied upon his subordinate's
judgment. The commander in chief would later write that Congress's desire
to retain the area's defense and his own wish to keep an impediment in the
enemy's way "caused that warfare in my mind and hesitation which ended in the
loss of the garrison."
On November 4 Howe dispatched several brigades to march
quickly south and reinforce Brig. Wilhelm von Knyphausen. His division
had crossed the river at Kingsbridge on November 2 and began harassment of the
rebels in the northern outpost of Fort Tyron. During the night of
November 14, 30 British flatboats sailed up the river past Fort Washington
undetected by the Americans. The following day the enemy approached the
fort in force.
Lord Cornwallis and Brig. Edward Matthew were to approach
from across the Harlem River on the east, and Percy was to strike from the
south. A British officer was sent to summon Magaw to surrender with the
threat of no quarter if the fort was stormed. Magaw flatly refused.
He had dispersed his forces at the various outposts on the three sides of the
fort, posting minor detachments in between. The Americans covered a large
perimeter of four to five miles. Early on the morning of November 16,
Knyphausen opened the attack against Col. Moses Rawlings's Virginia and
Maryland riflemen who managed to stall the Germans temporarily. Percy
advanced on Lt. Col. Lambert Cadwalader's Pennsylvanians but them halted (to
the Americans' surprise) to wait for a signal gun from Cornwallis or
Mathew. Washington, Greene, Maj. Gen. Israel Putnam, and Brig. Gen. Hugh
Mercer crossed to Fort Washington as the firing commenced, but they could do
nothing to help Magaw and so returned to Fort Lee to watch the developing
action.
Mathew, who had been somewhat delayed by the tide pushed
across the river and established a foothold on Laurel Hill. Cornwallis
followed with more troops. Once the signal had gone out to Percy,
pressure on the Americans began to mount. Rawlings was force back and
Cadwalader withdrew. Confusion was rampant within the reduced perimeter;
the retreating Americans poured into the fort. By 3:00 PM the Germans had
reached Fort Washington from the north, and the British were in view on the
east and south. Despite the original surrender terms, another flag was
sent into Magaw to ask for capitulation. Realizing that to stand now
would create a bloodbath within the crowded fort, Magaw surrendered.
The attack cost the British and Germans 67 killed, 335
wounded, and 6 missing. The Americans suffered 54 killed and 2,858
captured, including probably more than 1000 wounded. The loss of all
their arms and equipment was especially damaging.
Fort Lee was now untenable and Washington began transporting
the ammunition out of the fort. On the night of November 19 the British
brought boats through the Harlem River and carried a force under Cornwallis
across the Hudson in the rain. They landed about six mile north of Fort
Lee and began marching southward. Washington and Greene roused the
garrison to a hundred flight and led them to Hackensack, then toward Newark and
New Brunswick. Cornwallis marched into the empty fort on November 20 and
found tents, military baggage, 50 canon, and 1,000 barrels of flour. More
than 100 skulkers were rounded up in the neighborhood, a few were killed.
Cornwallis pursued the Americans with some reinforcements
sent from Howe and routed them at each New Jersey town where they
stopped. Many of Howe's officers believed he would maintain this
drive. As Lt. Frederick Mackenzie noted in his diary for November 21,
"This is now the time to push these rascals, and if we do, and not give them
time to recover themselves, we may depend upon it they will never make head
again. A body of troops landed at this time at Amboy might, in
conjunction with those already in Jersey, push on to Philadelphia, with very
little difficulty." But Howe had begun preparations for an offensive in
Rhode Island. He knew there was not time enough before winter's arrival
to employ the same troop force in both New Jersey and Rhode Island.
In addition, Howe was criticized by some for sparing the
garrison at Fort Washington. Capt. Lt. Archibald Robertson considered the
rebels' losses "trifling." Thomas Jones, a former justice of the New York
Supreme Court being held prisoner in Connecticut, believed that a general
slaughter would have struck panic through the rebel countryside and forced
congressional submission. "The most rigid severity at the first would
have been the greatest mercy and lenity in the end." Of the nearly 2,000
Americans captured in the fall of the fort, over 100 were officers. Many
of these were paroled and walked the New York streets in their uniforms to the
chagrin and even fear of the loyalists and British. The soldiers were
eventually put aboard prison ships in the harbor to languish; large numbers of
them died under the atrocious conditions.
But Howe's victory had been decisive, and for the Americans,
the aftereffects were serious. The loss of the garrison troubled
Washington because the enlistments of many of his remaining troops were to
expire in less than two months. An alarming percentage of his men were
unfit for duty from sickness or want of clothes and shoes. Perhaps even
more significant was the tremendous loss of precious material. The
British had seized 146 canon, 12,000 shot and shell, 2,800 muskets, and 400,000
cartridges. American resources had been dispersed and inadequate before
this capture; now they were stretched very thin indeed. Washington would
soon make his winter headquarters in New Jersey for a number of reasons, one of
which was to protect the invaluable forges and furnaces in the northwestern
part of the state.
The blame for squandering the men and supplies in the two
forts rested naturally with Magaw, Greene, and Washington. Greene
recognized that the lines around Fort Washington had been too extensive for
2,900 men to defend, especially in a disordered state. Since Washington
had some early doubts about the fort's impregnability, his vacillation, finally
favoring Greene's discretion, was inexcusable. Washington's trusted
friend Reed termed this a "fatal indecision of mind." Many British were
light-headed after their successful New York campaign and felt that the end of
the war must be near. But Washington's error was not fatal. Nor was
his disappointment so deep that he rejected thoughts of raising a new army.
Recommended readings: (Click on link to purchase)
 |
Title: Rise, and Fight Again : Perilous Times Along the Road to Independence || Author: Charles Bracelen Flood || ISDN: 0-396-07356-5 || Released: 1976 |
| Excellent overall, the section on the fall of Forts Washington and Lee is one of the best written and most comprehensive ever. A great book, with a unique focus: the worst disasters of the Continental Army. |
**Notes
Corbin, Margaret Cochran (1751-1800)