The Battle of Germantown

Battles Important People Important Places Historical Viewpoints Historical Events Historic Documents Timeline Recommended Readings Message Board Chat Home	Date: October 4th, 1777 Location: Germantown Pennsylvania Weather: 34`F, cloudy, morning fog American Casualties: 673 British Casualties: 537 American Leaders: Greene/Sullivan/Armstrong British Leaders: Col. Mawhood
		The Battle of Germantown

Overview:
    American intelligence reports of the divided British army dared Washington plan an assault on Germantown.  Lt. Gen. Sir William Howe, obsessed with securing uninterrupted access to the Delaware River, had dispatched some troops to take Billingsport, a vulnerable river fort near Chester.  He diverted another unit to escort supplies up from Head of Elk.  In Philadelphia a large detachment was left under Lord Cornwallis.  Howe's main body of 9,000 troops was encamped at Germantown, five miles north of the city.

Synopsis:
    In early October Washington still had 11,000 Continentals and militia dispersed along several miles north of Germantown.  Four roads led south to the village, suggesting to Washington a classic plan of battle.  It was simple in conception-the convergence of columns-but its execution was intricate, demanding exact, coordinated timing.  Maryland and New Jersey militia under Brig. Gen. William Smallwood and Col. Samuel Forman were to move down the easternmost road.  Pennsylvania militia under Brig. Gen. John Armstrong would occupy the western or Manatawny Road near the Schuylkill River.  In between these two lines were three divisions under Maj. Gen. Nathaniel Greene, representing two-thirds of the total American forces.  They would proceed down the Limekiln Road to strike at what was believed to be the stronger British flank on the right.  Maj. Gen. John Sullivan's column of three brigades on the Skippack Road was to head directly into Germantown, followed by Maj. Gen. William Alexander's (Lord Stirling) division.  The maneuver began on the night of October 3.
    If the coordination had been maintained, all four columns would have struck the British within a few minutes of one another early in the morning.  But in the night march Greene's guide lost his way and delayed  the strongest columns by half an hour.  Following rough roads, the militia units on the east were also slow to arrive at the scene.  The Pennsylvania militia on the west made contact with the British left and gave battle immediately.  The main strike came from Sullivan's corps.  Under cover of a heavy early morning fog, he drove in the enemy pickets and rolled back Howe's light infantry and the 48th Regiment.  With no immediate help on either side, especially to the east, Sullivan was forced to spread his troops sending Brig. Gen. Anthony Wayne to the extreme left.
    The British fell back more than two miles.  But Lt. Col. Thomas Musgrave, also shielded by the fog, sent six companies of the 40th Regiment into the Chew House, a large stone dwelling, and used it as a fort.  American momentum ground to a temporary halt as Washington called a hasty staff conference to consider the problem.  Some officers favored pressing forward and leaving a regiment behind to deal with the Chew House impediment.  A solution was offered by 27-year old Brig. Gen. Henry Knox, who remembered that no occupied garrison of the enemy should be left behind a forward advance.  Knox had owned a bookstore in Boston before the war, and his wide reading and authority in military literature was recognized.  Washington finally concurred.
    The plan resulted in a one-half-hour delay.  This gave Greene's forces time to catch up; they came along to the east just as part of Sullivan's command concentrated its fire on the Chew House.  Then, without orders, Maj. Gen. Adam Stephen led his division back westward toward the sound of the battle.  He blundered into Wayne's men in the fog and fired upon his fellow soldiers.  Believing that the British were about to enfilade, Wayne's troops ran back, and their panic infected the rest of Sullivan's force.  Despite Washington's attempt to rally his men, the attack began to fall apart.  An uncontrollable retreat ensued as Greene assaulted Luken's Mill, east of the Chew House.  In a dash from Philadelphia, Cornwallis appeared with a British reinforcement of three regiments.  He did not pursue the exhausted Americans vigorously, and by midmorning the battle was over.

Conclusion:
In his report to Congress, Washington blamed the fog and the Chew House "annoyance" for the collapse.  Stephen was court-martialed, found guilty of drunkenness, and dismissed from the army.  Greene's unfortunate tardiness was perhaps the biggest factor in blunting the attack.  It may be that Washington's strategy was too sophisticated for field officers who lacked tactical experience; and, there were many new, raw soldiers among both the Continentals and the militia.  What snatched victory from Washington's grasp were these imponderables.  The Americans believed they had nearly succeeded at Germantown, and this lifted morale, despite losses.  Washington suffered 152 killed, 521 wounded, and over 400 captured (many of these were probably counted as wounded).
    Howe reported 537 killed and wounded and 14 captured.  He recognized, after his narrow victory, that he could not string out his troops as he had done without courting attack.  A few weeks later, he evacuated Germantown and reestablished his troops in a line of forts north of Philadelphia.

Recommended readings: (Click on link to purchase)

	Title: Battle of Germantown || Author: Joseph P. O'Grady || ISDN: 9-991-68145-0 || Released: month year
	Excellent overall, the section on the fall of Forts Washington and Lee is one of the best written and most comprehensive ever.  A great book, with a unique focus: the worst disasters of the Continental Army.

	Title: The Surprise of Germantown : Or, the Battle of Cliveden, October 4th, 1777 || Author: ??? || ISDN: 0-000-00000-0 || Released: month year
	Excellent overall, the section on the fall of Forts Washington and Lee is one of the best written and most comprehensive ever.  A great book, with a unique focus: the worst disasters of the Continental Army.

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